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ABSTRACT 
The post-Enron period is characterised by increased efforts in strengthening corporate 
governance. In the wake of the financial crisis, however, the effectiveness of these 
(governance) reforms is put into question. Although the financial crisis seems to be caused by 
macro-instabilities and micro regulatory failures, it can be argued that governance failures 
aggravated the financial meltdown. This paper discusses the systemic governance failures that 
can (partly) explain the financial crisis and provides insights into the lessons to be learned. 
The analysis highlights four main deficiencies:  (i) inadequate monitoring by the market in 
combination with an ‘open’ shareholder model; (ii) the perverse side-effects of (variable) 
performance-related incentive schemes that were supposed to be the disciplinary mechanism 
per excellence for (top) managers; (iii) insufficient risk modelling and risk management 
which leads to poor external and internal supervision with regard to risk exposure and (iv) 
governance investments were too much focused on structures and procedures instead of on 
stimulating the right corporate behaviour and attitude. Furthermore, possible remedies to 
restore trust in the business world are being discussed. This includes -amongst others- a 
reflection on mechanisms that foster company-wide long-term value creation; proper risk 
assessment encompassing a true audit of strategic risks; a reconsideration of board roles and 
board composition, thereby paying more attention to leadership and personality issues; etc. 
Finally, the paper argues that the balance between regulation and self-regulation is at stake. 
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Over time, the development and refinement of corporate governance standards and 
recommendations have often been the consequence of corporate governance failures. Even if 
the collapse of Enron and the like, may not have been caused by corporate governance 
failures in a strict sense, there were serious deficiencies that facilitated or at least did not 
prevent such disastrous business practices. New legislation (like Sarbanes-Oxley and the 
European governance directives) and an impressive set of governance recommendations 
(European recommendations and numerous national governance codes) were developed to 
cure the governance deficiencies identified. The new legislations and recommendations of the 
post-Enron era implied important investments in new governance structures and procedures. 
This gave lean way to the expectation in the business world and society at large that the 
efficiency and effectiveness of governance would drastically increase. It is therefore all the 
more disturbing that those remedies have not been able to prevent the financial turmoil.  
Although the root causes of the financial crisis seem to lay in macro instabilities -
excessive liquidity and cheap money- and micro regulatory failures, numerous studies also 
point to governance failures, which -at least- aggravated the financial meltdown. According to 
the EU-report of the de Larosière Group (2009)1, corporate governance is one of the most 
important failures behind the present financial crisis. Also the OECD (2009b) clearly pointed 
to corporate governance failures as an important factor behind the financial collapse: ‘This 
Report concludes that the financial crisis can be to an important extent attributed to failures 
and weaknesses in corporate governance arrangements.” The prominent international 
shareholders’ association, ICGN (2009b), stated that it is now widely agreed that corporate 
governance failures were not the only cause of the financial crisis, but were highly significant. 
Other investors2 state that corporate governance did not cause the financial crisis (macro-
imbalances did), but certainly aggravated the crisis. In a report to the G20, Becht (2009;2) 
stated that the current financial crisis is a classic example of board failure on strategy and 
oversight, misaligned or perverse incentives, empire building, conflicts of interest, 
weaknesses in internal controls, incompetence and fraud.  
                                               
 
1
 'The high-level group on financial supervision in the EU', chaired by Jacques de Larosière, published its Report 
to the European Commission on February 25, 2009. 
2
 Peter Montagnon (ABI & European Corporate Governance Forum) defended this view at the European 
Commission’s Round Table on Director Remuneration on 23 March 2009. 
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Whether we like it or not, the societal backlash of these failures goes far beyond the 
financial sector. Society is loosing trust in business leaders in general and is heavily 
criticizing their societal behaviour, condemning their huge remuneration packages and the 
lack of effective board oversight.  
Therefore, everyone interested in effective governance has to further reflect on the 
lessons to be learned and on the possible remedies to restore (societal) trust in the business 
world. Besides our ambition of contributing to such deeper reflection, it is our goal to go 
beyond the symptoms and investigate the more systemic governance failures. It is clear that 
those governance failures are not the monopoly of the financial sector. On the contrary, the 
systemic governance failures could be relevant for all types of business activities and 
organisations. So the lessons to be learned and the possible remedies do have a far larger 
scope than financial institutions alone.  
Without having the intention neither to moralise on business practices nor to follow 
the societal revolt or the classical hunt for the guilty, we can not deny that even in companies 
that formally complied with most of the governance recommendations, things went wrong. As 
in the previous cycle, we can again try to analyse the underlying governance failures and 
investigate possible remedies. However, we have to notice that some of the previous remedies 
were insufficient and/or had (unforeseen) side-effects that made things even worse. 
Consequently we would like to point out that governance mechanisms should be critically 
evaluated on a regular basis, their side-effects be investigated and -where necessary- be 
drastically adapted. However, we should be aware that even strengthened governance cannot 
guarantee absence of corporate problems in the future. 
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1. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE MAY NOT/NO LONGER RELY ON THE 
ASSUMPTION THAT THE ‘MARKET WILL TAKE CARE OF IT’ 
Governance codes adhere to market discipline 
The leading (Anglo-American) corporate governance literature and the corporate 
governance codes for listed companies depart from the assumption that the market is the final 
disciplinary mechanism to guarantee that firms are governed in the best interest of their 
owners. In corporate finance and corporate governance this paradigm has long been defended, 
in the sense that listing at the stock exchange could only evolve towards a perfect market in as 
far as the shareholdership was completely open, dispersed and volatile. Such capital structure 
guaranteed that the requirements of market operation were optimally fulfilled, i.e. a large 
number of market parties that could not significantly influence the market price (dispersed 
shareholdership), shares that were often traded (high liquidity, thanks to high velocity and free 
float) and companies without any inside shareholders (who could take advantage of their 
controlling position to detract private benefits), but with outsiders that monitored the listed 
company on the base of equal information (fair disclosure) and in complete transparency.  
For a long time, corporate governance overwhelmingly focused on such types of open 
listed firms. Notwithstanding that the majority of listed companies all-over the world is still 
relying on inside shareholders (blockholders), there was a push towards more open, dispersed 
and anonymous shareholders. Governance best practices referred to open dispersed 
shareholdership as the bench mark. Governance ratings promoted open dispersed shareholders 
and disliked controlling shareholders and stable blockholding, penalising such companies 
with a lower governance rating.  
 
Curing the hurdles on the route to perfect markets 
But of course hurdles could exist on the route towards open market transactions. 
Therefore legislation had to guarantee that such barriers be eliminated and governance 
remedies had to be tailored to reach the goal of open financial markets.  
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Specific governance recommendations had to cure potential hurdles. Outside 
shareholders can only play their role as final gatekeeper of sound governance practices, if they 
possess a sufficient insight into the company, they invest in. Transparency rules are a first 
governance remedy allowing market parties to play their role. However companies with a 
dispersed shareholding structure have to cope with the collective action problem of passive, 
uninterested small shareholders3. Therefore, institutional investors are urged to play a more 
active role in disciplining the good governance of listed companies (see e.g. the ERISA-
legislation in the US, obliging public pension funds to use their voting rights). In practice, 
even the largest institutional investors hold relatively small stakes, so that it becomes hard to 
justify investing large amounts of money in monitoring their portfolio companies. Another 
remedy is the famous ‘pay for performance’ solution has been promoted to make sure that 
managers focused more on the interest of the dispersed shareholders. Besides board oversight 
(to promote shareholder’ interests) the last and ultimate discipline on management should be 
the market for corporate control: a manager that is only pursuing its self-interest while 
neglecting the shareholders’ interests can loose his job when the shareholders decide to sell 
the firm. Therefore no barriers should exist towards free trade in companies! 
Each of these remedies shows downsides, weaknesses and/or unintended negative 
side-effects, proving over and over again that the assumption of perfect markets is 
unsustainable! 
 
The financial crisis showed much deeper flaws in the perfection of (financial) markets 
Recently the perfect market paradigm has come under severe attack. In his most recent 
publication, George Soros (2008) pleads for a complete revision of this market 
fundamentalism. Markets do not operate perfectly, not only because information is incomplete 
but foremost because the market parties can play a disturbing role (reflexivity) on the market 
outcome. Their beliefs and previsions may substantially deviate from reality (intentionally 
influencing, if not even misleading other market parties) and this will affect the final outcome 
adversely and is at the origin of boom- and bust cycles.  
                                               
 
3
 Governance is often defined as the ‘resolution of collective action problems among dispersed investors’; see 
Becht (2009; 5). 
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The financial sector is all the more vulnerable in this respect, because expectations do 
play a very important role in the market operations. If financial markets are completely free 
this often leads to cycles of euphoria and desperation. Speculation, day trading and short 
selling can be seen as market corrective, but are often also disturbing a stable market output 
and market prices that no longer reflect the underlying value of the company or the asset.  
Looking at the actual financial crisis, cheap money (a Keynesian recipe to cure the 
crisis after the Internet bubble) seems to be at the origin4 of an unprecedented credit 
expansion, amplified and accelerated by complex and opaque financial innovation (from 
securitisation to artificial financial products). Consequently we witnessed important asset 
inflation, leading to a boom-bust bubble in all types of real and financial markets. The crisis 
erupted when monetary policy tightened, making capital more expensive 
 
IFRS: from a solution for better market transparency … 
In academic research as well as in business calculations, value is defined from a 
market perspective (what is the market capitalisation, the company’s value to a potential 
shareholder, a potential buyer, etc.) or from an accounting perspective. The market value can 
considerably differ depending on the market sentiment (cfr. boom and bust cycles). Former 
accounting principles where more historically oriented (with valuations based on historic cost 
and economic depreciation principles) and offered more opportunities for stabilising 
provisions, hereby allowing to neutralise volatile business cycle effects. However, such 
smoothing principles were considered opaque, not allowing outsiders to have a fair view on 
the underlying market value of the company. Modern IFRS-accounting is much more market 
oriented too (here again we feel the pressure of valuation for open market transactions) with 
consequently more volatility. 
As has already been explained earlier, transparency is the corner stone for efficient 
capital markets. Conditional upon such a market mechanism is to have a level playing field 
for all shareholders with sufficient and transparent information on the value of the 
corporation.  Shareholders -as outsiders- have to rely on such market information to decide on 
their selling and buying of stocks. IFRS accounting rules have become instrumental in this 
respect.  
                                               
 
4
 According to the EU-report presented by the ‘de Larosière Group’ (2009), the major underlying factor behind 
the financial crisis of 2008 is the fact that there was ample liquidity (thanks to the huge inflow of funds from 
countries such as China and the Middle-East) and very low interest rates. 
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Such rules proclaim that at any moment in time, outsiders should be aware of the true 
market value of all components of the corporation, while any form of internal reservation had 
to be abolished because this led to incomplete information for outside shareholders.  
 
…, to potentially adverse affects 
However, it is questioned whether important components of the IFRS-approach, like 
the fair value concept is fair at all. Such market-oriented valuation system has its downside, in 
that it is subject to increased volatility (pro-cyclicality) and negative spill-over effects, 
certainly in times of boom and bust. These adverse effects hold for the upside as well as for 
the downside trends5. Potential capital gains (market value above original cost or historic 
value) have to be accounted for, leading to an upswing in virtual profitability and reserves 
with potentially higher variable remuneration and dividend pay-outs, if not share buy-backs. 
The more such increase in asset prices are the effect of speculation and asset bubbles the more 
dangerous this capital distribution process becomes.  
The opposite (vicious) circular effects are noticed when market values substantially 
decrease. Accounting rules helped trigger a negative feed-back loop that amplified the 
downside effect of financial markets (de Larosière, 2009), leading to capital losses, need for 
impairments, depreciations and lower virtual profitability, eventually necessitating extra 
capital buffers, ‘fire sales’ while also limiting the growth and financing capacities. Moreover 
the more a company is judged on its short-term (quarterly) market value, the faster the 
downward spiral goes, when things go wrong. This vicious circle can become a systemic risk 
when it comes to financial institutions which heavily rely on mark-to-market operations for 
investments and financing. The question is therefore often raised to what extent the volatility 
syndrome of IFRS has been the fire that worsened the world-wide financial crisis 
(Wymeersch, 2008; Heremans in Killemaes and Mouton, 2008). 
 
                                               
 
5
 According to the EU-report presented by the ‘de Larosière Group’ (2009;8), ‘the rapid recognition of profits, 
which accounting rules allowed, led both to a view that risks were falling and to increases in financial results. 
This combination made institutions vulnerable to changes in valuation as economic circumstances deteriorated. 
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From loopholes in the regulatory approach and insufficient insights into financial 
innovations … 
In the post-communist era the free market fundamentalism won world-wide support 
far outside the sphere of the capital market. Economic policy at national and international 
level focused on optimal market operations and on the elimination of all relevant barriers to 
free competition (cfr EU liberalisation policy; cfr. abolishment of the Glass-Steagall act in the 
US). In such an era self-regulation was the route to complement a retreating supervision and 
regulation. The underlying paradigm of this free market movement is that markets can better 
regulate themselves because the invisible hand (the self-interest) of the rational market parties 
will lead to the optimal market outcome.  
The supremacy of market thinking has convinced regulators to draw back and rely 
more on self-regulation within the financial sector. The end of the Glass Steagal Act in the US 
has allowed investment banks to become active within the financial arena, while also allowing 
regular banks to become involved in much more types of investment banking. Moreover 
regulatory paradises continued to prosper for firms like hedge funds and the like, not being 
subjected to any regulation, regular depository banks have been faced with. But also 
depository banks have found a way around stricter regulation, by focusing more and more 
attention on ‘modern’ banking, preferably outside the perimeter of tough (solvency) rules. 
Numerous inventive and artificial investment vehicles were created, which allowed off-
balance transactions, engagements and leverage to grow exponentially, while at the same time 
being so complex that even standard risk models were no longer a valid tool for supervision. 
The standard model for calculating solvency requirements, foreseen in the Basle I rules, has 
been largely replaced by the Basle II facility to use internal risk models. Such flexibility again 
led to a larger degree of freedom causing at the same time a far more complicated supervision. 
According to the de Larosière report to the EU (2009), the definition of capital requirements 
placed too much reliance on both the risk management capabilities of financial institutions 
and on the adequacy of ratings while not sufficiently incorporating the macro-systemic risk of 
contagion. After the facts, one can observe that risks proved to be much higher than the 
internal models had expected! 
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…to a general plea for more and tougher regulations, also outside the financial sector  
Due to the loopholes in the regulation of financial market players and the serious 
monitoring mismatch, the cry for more and tougher regulation is loud and clear. Illustrative in 
this respect is the view of Sarkozy (2008): ‘L’autorégulation pour règler les problèmes, c’est 
fini. Le laissez-faire, c’est fini. Le marché a toujours raison, c’est fini. 
Although there are many arguments in favour of such extra regulation, the danger is 
that this will not be limited to the financial sector. To the extent that the origin of the crisis is 
more systemic to the financial sector, it should be questioned whether enlargement of the 
regulatory impact outside the financial institutions is justified. Self-regulation has the great 
advantage of flexibility, offering the possibility to tailor to the diverging and changing needs 
of the business world. Moreover, soft law may finally have more teeth than originally 
assumed, e.g. when jurisprudence is developed with reference to these self-regulatory 
principles. On top of that, boards of directors and shareholders that formally adhere to the 
governance principles will considerably increase the strength of self-regulation (Wymeersch, 
2008). 
In first instance, we should therefore try to encompass all relevant additional points of 
attention (e.g. remuneration, risk management) into the self-regulatory approach of 
governance codes. However, one can not be blind that some governance failures will 
necessitate complementing that self-regulation with additional regulation (e.g. on 
transparency). The EU sees the need for further regulation in two respects. The credit rating 
agencies, which greatly underestimated the risk exposures of banks, should be subjected to a 
registration within the EU as well as to external oversight. Another point for further regulation 
is remuneration. Since only 1 out of 3 member states seem to follow the EU recommendation 
on director remuneration, there is a need for some urgent measures, certainly in the financial 
sector. The EU will investigate clearer policy guidance in this respect, including shareholder 
voting on some remuneration issues. 
  
 12
Growing interdependence due to globalisation and repackaging of securities 
If there is one sector where globalisation has been realised to a large extent, it is the 
financial sector. Complex webs of companies, joint ventures and the like have been built 
around the world. However with the interrelationship between all players and with the 
interwoven products came also an important increase of vulnerability and systemic risk. 
Moreover with regulatory oversight still being mainly national, controlling such interlocking 
relationships and complex interdependencies, became very complex, if not impossible. 
The distance between the real economy and the financial economy has become that 
large that any feeling for proportion and economic sense seems to have been drifting away 
with every expansion of the financial system.  
 
In search for mechanisms to focus more on long term value creation and corporate 
responsibility  
Value creation is a crucial term in defining corporate success and in judging the 
quality and performance of a corporation, its management and its board. However, defining 
what value creation means, is not straight forward at all. What kind of value should be the 
reference base and how should we measure such important indicator? This discussion touches 
upon the ‘raison d’être’ of corporations and will be differently answered whether you are a 
day trader, a hedge fund, a family owner, an employee or a customer, to name only a few 
quite different views..  
Even hard defenders of open market transactions were not blind for the potential 
downsides of a too hard focus on self-interest and short term profit. Illustrative in this respect 
is the ground work of Adam Smith. In his ‘Theory of moral sentiment’ (1759) he clearly 
pointed to the fact that the driver of market operations and economic development, being 
profit, should be complemented with non-profit values. A market can only operate effectively 
if there is mutual trust between market parties and such trust is built on values such as 
fairness, human attitude, generosity, eye for the public good, etc. According to Adam Smith, 
the government had to play the role of watchdog and where private markets would fail, 
government needs to complement the supply of products and services (i.e. providing public 
goods). 
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According to Eddy Wymeersch (2008;1) the corporate governance debate remains 
constrained to the private interests of the parties involved and does not include the public 
good that may be affected by company decisions6. Notwithstanding some (rather marginal) 
socially responsible investment funds (SRI’s), capital markets traditionally attach most 
importance to the value created for the (public) shareholders. In the actual discussion of the 
financial crisis one of the main critiques on the market parties is that they -by far- focused too 
much on short-term value creation, at the detriment of huge risk exposures, while also 
ignoring the long-term and societal effect.  
There seems to grow a general consensus that shareholders should become more 
supportive of the long-term effects of business decisions and choices.  Companies with stable 
shareholders (like controlling shareholders) will probably have a far easier task in convincing 
their shareholders than those with mostly short-term traders as capital providers. But society 
is putting the heat on and is even going one step further in the direction of corporate social 
responsibility. The pressure is on companies to educate their shareholders so that they become 
more receptive, if not supportive of long-term value creation, including considerations on 
shareholder as well as stakeholder value.  
Taking into consideration the devastating externalities (societal and economic spill-
over effects) of the financial sector, there is a plea to consider the ‘general interest’ when 
developing governance structures and processes within financial institutions7. However some 
do make a clear distinction between the spill-over effects of financial institutions on financial 
and economic stability in general and the far broader concept of corporate social 
responsibility and ethical business behaviour. In this respect Eddy Wymeersch (2008;4) states 
that the concept of ‘ethics’ is usually too elusive to be considered a usable yardstick, at least 
in legal terms. Moreover the contribution to financial stability is quite different from CSR 
where no clear political authority is exercised, and where the use of corporate governance 
instruments is based on a largely voluntary approach. 
 
                                               
 
6
 Becht (2009) states that ‘corporate governance at the firm level, was never designed to internalize contributions 
to systemic risk’. This is all the more important in sectors facing such important risk, but in fact is relevant  in 
any firm engendering important external effects ((dis-)economies). 
7
 In this respect, Freddy Van den Spiegel (Fortis) (in Pironet, 2009) refers to the previous regulation in the 
Belgian Financial Sector that tried to improve the autonomy of boards of directors. In order to compensate for 
the impact of board representatives from the reference shareholders, regulation foresaw that all executives had to 
be part of the board of directors. 
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However, several frameworks for socially responsible business and reporting have 
been developed all-over the world. The OECD recently stated (2009a) that the global 
landscape of international initiatives to promote responsible business practice has become 
increasingly -and perhaps confusingly- crowed over the last decade. Such CSR-reporting 
focuses on the value creation from an economic (profit), social (people) and societal (planet) 
perspective. Contrary to this growing attention for corporate social responsibility reporting, 
most of the world-wide discussions on corporate governance ignore the ethical and 
stakeholder perspective. There have rarely been bridges between the traditional financial and 
governance frameworks at the one hand and the socially responsible reporting frameworks at 
the other hand8. In the future, governance codes will have to attach more attention to this 
‘enlightened shareholder value’ approach.  
The omission of an ethical and stakeholder perspective allows organisations to focus 
on short-term shareholder value, stock price and quarterly results. Although more nuanced 
approaches exist everywhere, most of the players in the financial world are (were?) adepts of 
the classical free market thinking. As already highlighted before, market fundamentalism 
leads to a nearly blind belief in the law of the market, also when it comes to the governance of 
market operations and market parties. As already stated by the founder of the open market 
transactions, Adam Smith, when ethics and integrity lack, the market can no longer operate as 
a good governance mechanism and capitalism dares to become casino-capitalism. Neglecting 
the long-term effect of corporate decision-making and totally ignoring the ethical dimension 
of profit maximisation are (partly) explanations for the mortgage-crisis in the US. The mere 
fact that they operated with so-called ‘teaser rates’ (very low initial interest rates) clearly 
proves that such practices were far from oriented towards long-term customer interests. 
                                               
 
8
 In this respect we would like to point to our proposal for a ‘socially responsible corporate governance’, 
published in ‘Corporate Governance in a globalising world: convergence or divergence? A European 
perspective’, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2002. 
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But the short-term disease is more widespread than in this mortgage-crisis. Financial 
firms, capital markets, financial analysts and large shareholder organisations have put the 
accent far too much on creating short-term shareholder value, as if it was the ultimate goal of 
the firm. In the absence of long-term shareholders, most listed companies are driven, if not 
biased by the share price and sometimes worse, making important choices and decisions on 
the base of the potential effect on the next quarter results. Interesting in this respect is the 
view of the de Larosière Group (2009): ‘It is clear that the financial system at large did not 
carry out its tasks with enough consideration for the long-term interest of its stakeholders. 
Shareholders' pressure on management to deliver higher share prices and dividends for 
investors meant that exceeding expected quarterly earnings became the benchmark for many 
companies' performance. The accounting system (IFRS) is facilitating and even supporting 
such short term valuation approach, while remuneration systems were further accentuating 
this focus.’ 
Even the international shareholders’ association, ICGN (2009a & 2009b) recognizes 
that the financial crisis was exacerbated by a failure of governance, both within bank boards 
and, in some cases, by lack of engagement of shareholders, responsible for governance 
oversight. They propose an elaborated set of shareholder responsibilities, such as explicit 
recognition of their responsibility to generate long term value, putting sufficient resources into 
governance that delivers long term value, taking governance factors as well as risk factors into 
consideration. 
The financial crisis showed that controlling shareholders or blockholders9 are -after 
all- not that bad when it comes to be a stabilising factor in times of turmoil, while giving 
preference to the long-term value creation over the short-term optimisation. Long-term 
shareholders are considered to have a more disciplinary impact on risk appetite (Heremans in 
Killemaes and Mouton, 2008), generating a more natural self-control (Colmant, 2008b), 
because of their more concentrated risk and their more important exposure to the well-being 
of the company. This does not imply at all that such type of controlled listed companies can 
not and do not suffer from specific governance challenges, such as the potential of making 
abuse of a controlling position, or depriving the company of growth perspectives because of 
the mantra of the controlling position of blockholders. 
                                               
 
9
 According to Becht (2009;8) large shareholders with a strong economic interest and voting rights are also a 
powerful approach to mitigating the collective action problem of dispersed shareholders. They have an interest in 
monitoring the board and through the board management. However there is a fundamental tradeoff between 
these advantages and the danger of abuse of a powerful position of these large shareholders. 
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2. REMUNERATION SYSTEMS: FROM A DISCIPLINARY GOVERNANCE 
REMEDY TO PERVERSE SIDE-EFFECTS 
 
Performance-related pay as a governance remedy,… 
The open capital market with dispersed shareholders embedded the danger that listed 
companies were directed by strong managers, while suffering from weak owners. Therefore, 
governance remedies had to be developed to make sure that (independent) managers were 
taking care of the ultimate goal of creating shareholder value. The board of directors had to 
make sure that managers were sufficiently disciplined and controlled. Performance-related 
executive remuneration was perceived to be the most important disciplinary mechanism in 
this respect. If managers would be generating more income conditional upon a shareholder 
value increase, this would engender them to stimulate shareholder value.  
 
…with important side-effects 
However, the remedy turned out to be sometimes worse than the sickness it had to 
cure! Such variable remuneration systems are not only open to management influence and 
sometimes outright manipulation they also can lead to short-term optimisation and overly 
risky behaviour.  
Already after Enron and comparable fraud cases, the governance codes made a plea 
for a more thorough board reflection on remuneration issues. The OECD governance 
principles e.g. recommend that executive (and board) remuneration should be aligned with the 
longer term interests of the company and its shareholders and that a remuneration policy 
statement should specify the relationship between remuneration and performance (including 
measurable performance standards). However significant this evolution may be, one may not 
forget that the problem has not been sufficiently cured yet.  
More attention should be given to controlling the spill-over effects of executive 
remuneration structures. Remuneration practices are one of the important reasons for the 
financial crisis, according to the de Larosière report to the EU (2009).  
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The OECD report on the financial crisis (2009b) highlighted that “remuneration 
systems have in a number of cases not been closely related to the strategy and risk appetite of 
the company and its longer term interests10... Incentive systems encouraged and rewarded 
high levels of risk taking, and as such worsened the failures of the risk management systems”. 
Another complicating if not aggravating effect on performance measurement came 
from the accounting rules. Such rules induce a systematic bias towards short-term 
performance, because they allowed immediate recognition of mark-to-market profit without 
necessitating a discount for future potential losses. As a result of all this, the long-term, 
"through the cycle" perspective has been neglected. 
 
But there is much more at stake than executive remuneration 
It is insufficient to focus only on the remuneration of top executives. Many 
organisations, not in the least those in the financial sector, have rolled-out the variable 
remuneration system to many other levels of the organisation. The OECD analysis of the 
financial crisis (2009b) clearly states that remuneration systems lower down the management 
chain might have been an even more important issue than the executive remuneration. 
Also the de Larosière report to the EU (2009) stated that remuneration and incentive 
schemes within financial institutions contributed to excessive risk-taking by rewarding short-
term expansion of the volume of (risky) trades rather than the long-term profitability of 
investments. Most of the incentives encouraged financial institutions to act in a short-term 
perspective and to make as much profit as possible to the detriment of credit quality and 
prudence.  
At whatever level, if greediness reigns, variable remuneration systems can become 
devastating for the long-term success and even the stability of the firm. 
 
                                               
 
10
 To some extent, the OECD seems less severe than e.g. de Larosière Group in their judgement on the negative 
effect of the executive remuneration structure. 
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In search of possible remedies 
It is certainly premature to formulate already definite routes to solve such an important 
problem as the ‘pay-for-performance’. Unfortunately there is today more heat than light in the 
public debate around incentives and remuneration structure (Kirkpatrick, 2009).  In such a 
climate of societal revenge, referring to top managers as the new ‘barbarians’, there is huge 
pressure to regulate and limit (executive) remuneration (by setting maximum amounts, 
maximum multiples and/or by huge tax rates). As stated by the de Larosière Group (2009) we 
should not have the illusion that regulation alone will allow solving such huge problems. 
Thanks to the numerous proposals on the table11 and the intensive debate around 
executive remuneration and bonus payments12, we can already detect a number of key 
elements of possible remedies. We would like to group them in the following categories: first 
and foremost the substance discussion on the remuneration policy (why and which type of 
variable remuneration) second, the process and conditions to develop and apply such 
remuneration policy and finally the transparency issues. 
 
• The substance discussion on remuneration policy 
On top of the existing guidelines and formalities defined in the governance codes, 
more reflection is necessary on the remuneration policy especially from the perspective of the 
remuneration structure and severance pay. In most of the cases, it is not so much a discussion 
on the level of the remuneration itself (although this has caused most societal and political 
discussions) but on the remuneration structure, mainly in the light of potential downsides and 
spill-over effects or unintended consequences.  
A first point of reflection is to clearly define the type of performance measures or 
criteria that form the basis for the variable remuneration. Should they be financial or also 
include non-financial elements? Should the financial criteria focus on shareholder value and 
be market-based or (also) include accounting and budgetary criteria? There is an 
overwhelming agreement that whatever criteria used, one should make sure that company-
wide long-term value creation is sufficiently taken into consideration.  
                                               
 
11
 In this respect we would like to refer to the detailed analysis of the OECD report (2009b) and de Larosière 
Group (2009) as well as to the recent proposal of the European Corporate Governance Forum (2009b) and the 
UK Financial Services Authority (2009). In the UK, the supervisor of the financial sector, the FSA, has launched 
a draft Code of practice on remuneration policies. The principles set forward in this Code will be instrumental in 
defining eligibility for government support of financial institutions and, once accepted, they will be used for 
judging the risk profile and necessary capital buffer of ALL financial institutions. Even UK-subsidiaries of 
foreign companies are obliged to install a remuneration committee.  
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Interesting best practices point to the use of a balanced score card approach to design 
variable remuneration systems. This is also the proposal developed by the UK financial 
services authority in their recent draft remuneration guidelines: “Firms should not assess 
performance solely on the results of the current year and also non-financial performance 
metrics should form a significant part of any variable remuneration system. Sufficient 
attention should be paid to the quality of the business, its risk profile, its sustainability and 
suitability for the client. Therefore a balanced scorecard is a good instrument in this respect.” 
(FSA, 2009). Suggestions also include using a multi-year framework for the assessment of 
bonuses13 and extending the period for the vesting of stock options. But attention for the fiscal 
aspects of such proposals will be necessary. Given the huge differences in tax treatment of the 
variable remuneration components it will be very hard to come to an international level 
playing field in this respect.  
A second condition is to design a variable remuneration policy that supports sound 
risk management. If there is only an upside to the performance-related pay system, managers 
and employees will be stimulated to go for the upside, even if this comes at the detriment of a 
much higher risk and the long term success of the company. Moral hazard is a well-known 
concept in insurance economics and is a relevant reflection when it comes to discussing the 
downside-effects of remuneration incentives (Bostyn, 2008)  
The UK proposal for the financial sector gives detailed recommendations to develop 
remuneration policies that are risk-focused (for the bonus as well as for the long-term 
incentive plan). The aim is to ensure that firms have remuneration policies which are 
consistent with effective risk management, and which do not expose them to excessive risk-
taking by staff (so explicitly going beyond the executive level14). Poor remuneration policies 
can lead to implicit or explicit expectations of performance from the employee, which are 
misaligned with the firm's risk appetite and contrary to sound risk management. Concrete 
proposals include the focus on profits, adjusted for current and future risk and taking into 
account the cost of capital employed and the liquidity required. Other suggestions are 
introducing a bonus-malus philosophy and claw-back clauses. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
12
 The European Commission organised a Round Table on Director’s Remuneration on 23 March 2009. 
13
 In the de Larosière Group report (2009) the suggestion is given to use a 5-year approach towards bonuses. 
14
 It is clearly stated that the field of reference therefore goes beyond executive remuneration and presumably 
encompasses all types of variable remuneration. 
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Principles of Conduct for Compensation Policies (International Institute of 
Finance (2008)  
 
1. Compensation incentives should be based on performance and should be 
aligned with shareholder interests and long term, firm-wide profitability, 
taking into account overall risk and the cost of capital 
2. Compensation incentives should not induce risk-taking in excess of the firms 
risk appetite. 
3. Payout of compensation incentives should be based on risk-adjusted and cost 
of capital-adjusted profit and phased, where possible, to coincide with the risk 
time horizon of such profit. 
4. Incentive compensation should have a component reflecting the impact of 
business unit’s returns on the overall value of related business groups and the 
organisation as a whole. 
5. Incentive compensation should have a component reflecting the firm’s overall 
results and achievement of risk management and other goals. 
6. Severance pay should take into account realised performance for shareholders 
over time. 
7. The approach, principles and objectives of compensation incentives should be 
transparent to stakeholders. 
 
 
However, integrating risk management into the remuneration system will necessitate 
much harder changes, than merely adding a risk management specialist to the remuneration 
committee. The whole performance management approach will have to be expanded in order 
to integrate the right risk profiles (Visser, 2008). Even with a balanced score card, the 
framework will have to be complemented with critical risk indicators for each of the critical 
performance indicators. 
If it is true that much of the financial crisis problems go back to corporate behaviour, 
short-term focus and greed being ingrained in the incentive structure, the challenge is even 
more huge, i.e. to change corporate attitude and behaviour. More attention should therefore be 
paid to the alignment of the remuneration system and structure (criteria to be integrated in 
defining management performance and variable remuneration) with corporate values (relevant 
definition of value creation) as well as with the criteria set forward in attracting top 
management (such as leadership, integrity, etc.) (Verbeke, 2009).  
Or should we look for more drastic solutions, like abolishing all complex formula of 
variable remuneration or limiting the relative weight of variable remuneration? A number of 
suggestions can shed more light on possible routes ahead.  
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For what concerns ‘supervisors’, like the risk management function or independent 
directors, international proposals plead for determining their (variable) remuneration 
independently of business performance15. Also the practices with smaller listed companies 
(often with inside, controlling shareholders) and non-listed companies can be worthwhile to 
study as potential best practices. Most of these companies combine the benefits of variable 
remuneration (stimulating performance, effectiveness and efficiency) without the numerous 
side-effects. The relative weight of their variable remuneration is mostly quite lower than in 
the large listed companies (Baeten, 2008), while at the same time often capping the maximum 
amount of such variable remuneration. It is very interesting to observe that the UK Financial 
Services Authority came to a comparable conclusion, when studying the necessary 
improvements to the remuneration policy of financial firms. They proposed that the fixed 
component of the remuneration should be sufficiently high to allow the company to operate a 
fully flexible bonus policy. Recent OECD-research in the financial sector revealed a huge 
reliance on variable remuneration, on average around 75% at European banks, but 94-96% in 
US banks! 
Another innovation suggested (Van de Cloot in BZB, 2009) is to introduce a kind of 
‘bonus-malus’ provision for the variable part, whereby variable remuneration can even be 
negative in certain crisis years. Spreading the payment over a rather long time, this would 
allow for a more stabilised remuneration. But some commentators do point to the danger of 
‘punishing’ management for entrepreneurial ventures that prove to turn out worse than 
expected. It is crucial that there remains sufficient entrepreneurship within any firm, and this 
basically necessitates the willingness to take entrepreneurial risk. So the solution proposed 
would be to agree upon the degree of risk appetite and honour entrepreneurship as long as the 
ex-post risk profile is within the boundaries set (Visser, 2008). 
 
• The process to develop and apply a remuneration policy 
In this respect an important question is ‘who is responsible for what part of the 
remuneration puzzle?’. What is the role of the board of directors and of the remuneration 
committee, do shareholders have a ‘say on pay’ and what input should be expected from 
executive management and from external remuneration consultants? The responsibilities of 
                                               
 
15In the UK proposals for remuneration practices in financial institutions it is proposed that compensation for 
staff in the risk and compliance functions should be determined independently of the business areas. They should 
have different performance metrics, with greater emphasis on the achievement of their own objectives. 
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both external monitors and internal monitors are at stake and should be carefully revisited in 
order to find solutions to cure the problem.  
For what concerns the internal monitors, the first duty rests with the board of directors 
and its remuneration committee. Designing the remuneration structure and setting the levels 
of remuneration is first and foremost a matter for the board. The EU-recommendation on 
director remuneration already pointed to the important role of the remuneration committee (in 
listed16 companies) and the conditions on its composition (independence from management) 
and functioning (executives should not be involved in setting their own remuneration). 
However, failures of executive remuneration policies necessitate additional recommendations, 
such as a more careful examination of the potential risks and down-side effects of variable 
remuneration. Remuneration committees should specifically analyse the danger of excessive 
risk-taking and short-termism to the detriment of long-term performance. Illustrative in this 
respect is the UK Financial Services Authority draft Code which fosters sufficient attention 
for the potential side-effects of variable remuneration on risk taking. They propose that at 
least one member of the remuneration committee should have practical skills and expertise of 
risk management and that there should be regular reporting from the firm’s risk manager. 
Moreover independent supervision on the risk-adjustment factors necessitates more attention 
for the status of the top risk manager and his remuneration. 
Aside from the huge tasks on the shoulders of the boards of directors, also 
shareholders should play their part in curing the problem. Shareholders’ activism has been 
growing and they want a ‘say on pay’. Therefore issues of transparency and involvement of 
shareholders in important remuneration discussions seem an important step forward. 
However, it is also fair to say that shareholders, when judging business performance, should 
become more supportive of the long-term success of the firm. Companies with stable 
shareholders (like controlling shareholders) will probably have a far easier task in convincing 
their shareholders than those with mostly short-term traders as capital providers. Stating, like 
the de Larosière report (2009) that ‘it is important to re-align compensation incentives with 
shareholder interests and long-term, firm-wide profitability’ is probably less straight-forward 
than assumed! 
 
                                               
 
16
 In the UK draft Code of practice on remuneration policies in the financial sector, even UK-subsidiaries of 
foreign companies will be obliged to install a remuneration committee. 
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Remuneration consultants have been criticised for their upward effect on executive 
remuneration. They facilitated positioning executive remuneration at above median market 
levels, with comparisons focusing on top remunerated peers. Such market references induced 
a continuous international upward trend. In its 2003 study on corporate governance, the 
Economist Intelligence Unit referred in this respect to the so called ‘Lake Wobegon Effect’ 
(after Garrison Keillor's mythical US prairie town where 'all the children are just above 
average'). Every company is assumed to pay 60 to 70% of average compensation for whatever 
peer group their consultant defines, thus constantly ratcheting up pay. The 2009 UK draft 
code on remuneration in financial firms explicitly stated that the need for firms to offer 
competitive remuneration packages is recognised, but that industry comparators should be a 
secondary rather than a primary factor in the determination of the remuneration. Many 
commentators want the board of directors to take a far more active role in judging the 
effectiveness and fairness of a remuneration policy. Moreover, if they are to rely on external 
consultants they should pay far more attention to their independence in relation to 
management. In this respect, experience should be gained with the solutions found in the post-
Enron slipstream to cope with the many conflicts of interest between audit firms and their 
clients. The remuneration committee could be inspired by the audit recommendations and 
critically evaluate the independence of remuneration advisors.  
 
• The transparency internally and externally 
The remuneration committee will be asked to provide evidence of how well its 
remuneration policies measure against these new principles, together with plans for 
improvement where there is a significant shortfall. In its annual remuneration report they will 
also be asked to report on the ‘people risk’. The statement should include an assessment of the 
impact of their remuneration policies on behaviour, and on the risk profile of the firm. In 
drawing up this assessment, boards and remuneration committees should exercise their own 
judgement and not rely solely on the judgement or opinions of others. It would be good 
practice to make such report available to the shareholders. 
Up till now the emphasis has merely been on information to shareholders and external 
market comparisons in judging the fairness of executive and variable remuneration. The spill-
over effect of this external transparency has been a heavy public discussion, increasingly 
focusing on the societal fairness of such compensation. This societal heat will be taken over 
by trade unions and employees who will demand remuneration committees to also reflect on 
internal fairness and transparency. 
 24
 
3. LARGE FAILURES IN RISK MODELLING AND RISK MANAGEMENT  
In a financial market with plenty liquidity and low interest rates, investors as well as 
financial players were actively searching for higher yields, accepting more risk. At first, 
securitisation has been considered to be the ‘nec plus ultra’ of financial innovation. It allowed 
credit institutions and insurance companies to enlarge their debt capacity at attractive prices 
(also with respect to the necessary solvency capital). For investment banks it was a very 
lucrative type of business, because it allowed them becoming financial engineers in packaging 
and repackaging assets with different categories of risk profile. But also for credit rating 
agencies a new market could be developed with tailored ratings for each of those categories of 
collateralised debt. But we may not forget that everybody was benefiting from these 
developments. Coupled with cheap money, global risk spreading in different layers had a 
beneficiary effect on the cost of capital. Consequently business firms as well as private 
households could increasingly rely on cheap money and high credit leverage. Shareholders 
pushed companies to increase their degree of financial leverage, preferably by buying back 
shares or paying out super dividends. 
 
Fundamental failures in the assessment of risk, …  
There have been quite fundamental failures in the assessment of risk, both by financial 
institutions and by those supervising them. Risk became mis-priced from several perspectives. 
Risk structures of securitised assets were approved and granted a good rating without tough 
scrutiny of the quality of the counter parties involved. Issuers seemed to shop around to get 
the best rating, while credit rating agencies were subject to conflicts of interest, rather than 
being able to express independent judgements. In the ‘originate-to-distribute model’, where 
the lender knew beforehand that he would transfer or sell the portfolio and/or the default risk 
through collateralized debt structures, there was no incentive to ensure high lending standards, 
leading to a severe weakening of underwriting standards. Moreover it was assumed that 
global risk spreading over numerous layers and parties was supposed to almost, if not fully, 
eliminate the risks involved.  
Proper risk assessment was very difficult and opaque for external and internal 
supervisors not in the least because of the extreme complexity of such structured products, 
their numerous layers and parties involved (there was little knowledge of either the size or the 
location of credit risks, not knowing whether risk had been really spread or simply re-
concentrated in less visible parts of the system).  
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But even worse, the risk models used by financial institutions and credit rating 
agencies assumed stable markets, hereby completely ignoring systemic risk (underestimation 
of correlations in the defaults that would occur during a downturn, e.g. the collateralized 
mortgage obligations assumed that the prices of real estate would not be subject to negative 
spiral effects). We have all witnessed that the reality in the financial markets is much more 
instable and vulnerable to so-called ‘Black Swans’, e.g. no bank expected a total freezing of 
the inter-bank or commercial paper markets (dixit the de Larosière report; 2009). The silo 
approach of risk assessment per type of product or line of business induced an insufficient 
awareness of the firm-wide exposure and the correlations between different risk factors. 
 
…, aggravated by failures in corporate governance  
The OECD (2009b) Steering Group on Corporate Governance has pinpointed the 
failures in risk management as the most important diagnosis of the financial crisis, but this 
failure is largely attributed to weaknesses in corporate governance, more than to defaulting 
risk assessment or risk models. “When they were put to a test, corporate governance routines 
did not serve their purpose to safeguard against excessive risk taking in a number of financial 
services companies. The risk management systems have failed in many cases due to corporate 
governance procedures rather than the inadequacy of computer models alone.” 
The OECD (2009b) identified the following weaknesses: information about exposures 
in a number of cases did not reach the board and even senior levels of management, while risk 
management was often activity rather than enterprise-based. These are board responsibilities. 
In other cases, boards had approved strategy but then did not establish suitable metrics to 
monitor its implementation. Company disclosures about foreseeable risk factors and about the 
systems in place for monitoring and managing risk have also left a lot to be desired (even 
though this is a key element of the OECD Governance Principles). 
 
Although this analysis focused on the financial institutions, the lessons learned can be 
relevant for each board of directors. A critical examination of the risk management capacities 
of a board of directors should at least touch upon the following questions:  
 Has the board obtained the relevant information? 
 Is there a solid risk culture throughout the firm with clear emphasis on the respective 
roles of the CEO and the board? 
 Are board members sufficiently literate on business risk? 
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Beyond board level, a lack of internal governance 
In its most simple approach, ‘corporate’ governance, is about how a firm is directed 
and controlled. The numerous corporate governance codes around the world mainly focus on 
the corporate board of directors as the main vehicle to reach good corporate governance, with 
some minor attention for the relationship with and the respective role of shareholders and top 
management, while ignoring most, if not all other layers (internal organisation, business units, 
operating companies, subsidiaries, joint ventures, etc). The basic rules of corporate 
governance recommend sufficient checks and balances, segregation of functions and 
accountability for delegated decision-making power. However, insufficient attention has been 
paid to the necessity to apply these rules to ALL levels of decision-making. The huge 
attention paid to compliance with corporate governance codes and regulations is ineffective 
without a well-developed system of ‘internal’ governance.  
The famous Sarbanes-Oxley act (agreed upon with near unanimity of the US-Congress 
as the remedy to the corporate crisis around Enron, WorldCom etc) was a first attempt to 
regulate the internal governance aspects from the perspective of internal control and risk 
management. After some years, all firms listed in the US as well as their world-wide 
operating companies, have been faced with tougher rules on risk management and internal 
control. But also the OECD governance principles have attached special attention to the fact 
that the monitoring role of the board includes continuous review of the internal structure of 
the company “to ensure that there are clear lines of accountability for management 
throughout the organisation”. This internal governance aspect has presumably not received 
the attention it deserves17.  
But even with tough internal control and risk management there are huge challenges 
boards of directors and top management face in today’s complex (financial) business world. 
The more complex and global such groups become and the more sophisticated product 
innovations are, the more unrealistic it is to assume that a limited number of top people and 
directors at corporate level can follow-up and completely oversee such global web of 
organisations and complex products.  
                                               
 
17
 Although the Basel Committee (and some national banking supervisors) developed specific internal 
governance recommendations (see e.g. http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs122.htm). 
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The OECD (2009b) reports that risk issues are increasingly becoming too specialist 
for meaningful oversight by the whole board. We therefore need to reflect on ways to make 
decision-makers at all levels in the organisation more aware of, if not responsible for, the 
short as well as the long-term effects of their choices and decisions, without killing their 
entrepreneurship and creativity. If accountability and governance rules are not deployed to all 
relevant levels of a complex organisation, no top management, directors, nor shareholders can 
have a quiet night sleep.  
Or have we reached a level where diseconomies of scale and scope become 
devastating? This is e.g. the thesis defended by Eric de Keuleneer (2009). Louis Verbeke 
(2009) stated that we underestimated the cost of complexity (in part driven by size). Should 
we also not review the loss of control and knowledge caused by outsourcing, reduction of 
headquarters, etc? Charting such complexity costs seems necessary to reach optimal business 
decisions. Ultimately it is the total architecture which may be at stake, including globalisation 
and the internal governance consequences which come with it (like supply chain efficiency 
and accountability for it). 
 
Insufficient discussion on the strategic risks and on defining the corporate risk appetite 
Notwithstanding the huge investments in compliance with tougher audit and risk 
management prescriptions, it seems that such rules have been unable to prevent a serious 
financial crisis. An additional explanation could be that business practice does not sufficiently 
tackle all the relevant and important risk exposures. The OECD (2009b) analysis pointed to 
the fact that board of financial institutions had approved strategy but did not establish suitable 
metrics to monitor its implementation. Research and board experience in different sectors 
demonstrates that internal control and risk management systems mainly devote attention to 
managing financial and operational risk, but do ignore most of the ‘strategic’ risks. This is 
clearly also the opinion of the OECD (2009b), who state that “attention in recent years has 
focused on internal controls related to financial reporting and on the need to have external 
checks and reporting… It needs to be stressed, however, that internal control is at best only a 
subset of risk management and the broader context, which is a key concern for corporate 
governance, might not have received the attention that it deserved, despite the fact that 
enterprise risk management frameworks are already in use.”  Ralph Ward (2009) puts it 
differently: ‘Sarbanes-Oxley changes focused boards closely on compliance and disclosure 
rules, while they missed big management strategic blunders’.  
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Management should facilitate that the board can exercise its responsibility to oversee 
the complete risk exposure and to decide on the risk appetite of the corporation. The board 
must ensure that risk appetite is a coherent reflection of the company’s strategic targets. In 
making important board decisions on strategic choices, directors should be faced with a true 
audit of the strategic risks involved, with different possible scenarios and their underlying 
risks and assumptions as well as with the overall firm-wide risk exposure.  
From a theoretical perspective, the Enterprise Risk Model encompasses all types of 
risks. However, the auditors and internal control departments mostly focus on traditional 
financial and operational risk management, ignoring most of the time the strategic risks. What 
could have caused this omission? Didn’t they have the right expertise to do so, or were they 
not involved, nor consulted to advise on strategic risks? In some cases, the OECD research 
(2009b) has observed that boards were not aware of important strategic decisions or were not 
sufficiently informed on the complete risk exposure, etc. But also boards need to understand 
the firm’s business strategy from a forward looking perspective, not just review current risk 
issues and audit reports. 
 
Ignoring the behavioural aspect of risk management 
The analysis of the failures in corporate risk management is incomplete if one should 
not also point to the behavioural dimensions. It seems that the lower prestige and status of risk 
management staff vis-à-vis traders and sales people played an important role in suppressing 
the efficient information and discussion of risk exposure in financial institutions. The de 
Larosière Group proposed several (procedural) remedies to improve risk monitoring and 
sound risk management. The top or senior risk managers should have a high-ranking status 
and be allowed to have a direct line with the board of directors (comparable to the internal 
auditor). The chief risk officer should have direct access to the board and the audit committee 
(as is already the case for the internal auditor).  
Another remedy being that companies should move towards a culture of shared 
responsibility and mutual respect.  
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It is essential that there is a culture to pass all relevant information on risk exposure 
and possible red flags to the top layers of the organisation, a mentality to share quantitative 
and qualitative information more efficiently across the firm and to engage in a more effective 
dialogue across the firm. ‘Bad news should travel fast’ has been the successful recipe of many 
long-standing family business firms18 
But also the remuneration of the (chief) risk officer(s) deserves further attention. It is 
said that effective checks and balances are unlikely to work if those who are supposed to 
control risk remain under-paid, compared to those whose job it is to take risks. The Financial 
Services Authority in the UK goes one step further in proposing that their remuneration 
structure should eliminate possible conflicts of interest. For risk managers their variable 
remuneration should not refer to any business output measure but depend upon risk 
management indicators. 
 
4. GOVERNANCE MECHANISMS: INSUFFICIENT FOCUS ON SUBSTANCE AND 
TOO MUCH ATTENTION FOR FORMALITIES  
 
In its study of the corporate collapses at the beginning of this century (Enron and the 
like), the Economist Intelligence Unit (2003) concluded that ‘companies are putting in place 
new governance processes but these processes do not necessarily lead to substantive changes; 
the form-over-substance problem is exemplified by efforts to supercharge the audit 
committee;… rules and regulations may help shore up confidence in the market but they will 
not magically produce good behaviour'. Six years later, the OECD steering committee on 
corporate governance (2009b) poses the question whether boards are up to their huge tasks, 
while the Institute of International Finance (2008) concluded that events have raised questions 
about the ability of certain boards to properly oversee senior management and to understand 
and monitor the business. These are potentially worrying conclusions, which necessitate far 
more in-depth reflection on governance failures and possible remedies. 
This is all the more problematic since the post-Enron era was characterised by an 
increased focus on the empowerment of the board of directors. Such empowerment was the 
red line through the governance codes, that were developed all-over the world.  
                                               
 
18
 Corporate value fostered by the late Paul Fentener-van Vlissingen, former chairman of  SHV, a family-owned 
conglomerate in the Netherlands. 
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It is therefore understandable that numerous specialised studies mirror the 
disappointment of society at large with the ineffectiveness of these huge investments in 
governance structures and procedures. The governance codes and regulations seem to have 
been unable in preventing the financial meltdown. As described before the potential factors 
that caused the financial crisis are far more complex than mere governance failures alone. 
However, we should be honest in stating that a number of shortcomings in the governance 
practice have accelerated the financial collapse.  
 
In search of the right attitude and behaviour  
The main critique on the effectiveness of governance in general and of board of 
directors more specifically is that boards failed to understand and manage risk, while at the 
same time tolerating perverse incentive systems. But also shareholders are not free of critique. 
They are blamed for having tolerated such board behaviour while at the same time allowing, 
if not stimulating huge leverage levels and a short-term focus. 
Overlooking such analyses, we have to conclude that these deficiencies finally boil 
down to corporate behaviour and deploying the right governance attitude. Such goal can 
hardly be reached by regulation or legislation. As stated by ICGN (2009b) reform is as much 
about behaviour as it is about prescription. We will -whether we like it or not- have to rely on 
improving the focus of the governance codes and on redefining best practices. We are 
certainly not lacking governance codes and recommendations, but up to now they have 
focused on ‘structural’ governance factors, such as composition of the board of directors, 
CEO-Chair duality, independent directors, presence of board committees and the like. Best 
practices were defined with reference to this ‘easy to check’ input characteristics. However, 
substance should reign over form. 
Board effectiveness and the quality of governance are also, if not more, driven by the 
right governance processes and the right attitude. But this attention for corporate attitude and 
behaviour does not stop at the board of directors or at the level of top management. On the 
contrary, everybody should be involved in this attitude focus. The mindset, the ethical 
attitude, the integrity of people do necessitate much more attention in order to guarantee that 
good structures, good principles and processes also get applied in practice (so discipline is 
important). Combining corporate with internal governance is also from this perspective the 
broader framework we should all look for. But the right tone and the right culture should start 
at the top!  
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The right governance attitude encompasses also the right tone towards shareholders: 
not overly promising, nor creating unrealistic expectations. At the same time managers will 
have to educate their shareholders and try to withstand short-term market pressures. Strong 
managers have a straight back in defending long-term strategies and investments, even if 
short-term oriented shareholders/sharetraders would pressure them to act otherwise.  
 
In search of the right balance in the board’s role  
The numerous governance codes introduced considerably more duties, commitment 
and time investment19 for directors. Although the board’s role has drastically increased the 
last decade boards are criticized for having been too complacent and unable to prevent the 
collapse of a number of financial institutions.  
In the light of the previous analysis of the governance failures, we should reconsider 
the right balance of duties of a board of directors.  
There is foremost a need to reconsider the primordial role of board when it comes to 
having the right leadership. Much more attention should be paid to the personality of the top 
people: do they have the right attitude, the right alignment with corporate values, ambitions, 
corporate strategy and the time horizon (long-term versus short-term optimisation)? To this 
end, the board’s role does not stop with the nomination of the top manager(s). Non-executive 
directors should also critically monitor and evaluate management in the light of these 
principles, including decisions on their remuneration, while at the same time being supportive 
of management. This in itself is certainly a delicate balance!  
When it comes to their strategic role, they should make sure that a thorough discussion 
of the strategic scenario’s and routes includes sufficient attention for the specific 
risk/performance profile; clearly defining the specific risk appetite of the firm. 
The monitoring of corporate performance and reporting should pay attention to 
financial as well as to non-financial reporting, to audit, internal control and risk management. 
One of the duties of the board is to have a very clear understanding of the final goals of the 
firm, considering criteria to evaluate the long-term shareholder value as well as the impact on 
the relevant stakeholders. Such (balanced score card?) framework should be applied whenever 
important strategic decisions have to be made, as well as when monitoring the execution and 
the results they entailed.  
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In search of the right balance in board composition  
Although independence of the board remains an important ingredient of corporate 
governance, it should be clear that independence has been the only important characteristic 
the codes have relied upon. This is incomplete from two respects. 
First of all, independence may not come at the detriment of sufficient business insight, 
expertise and know how of the strategic challenges and risk of the business portfolio. The 
OECD report (2009b) refers to a head hunter, stating that “one of the unintended 
consequences of Sarbanes Oxley is that its emphasis on independence rules out from board 
positions a lot of people who knew about this business”. This coincides perfectly with the 
statement made by Emilio Botin (2008), the Chairman of Banco Santander: “For years, the 
idea of a mostly independent board was promoted as a hallmark of good governance: the best 
director was the one most removed from the business because he was the most independent. 
That was the wrong approach”.  
In their governance analysis the de Larosière Group (2009) explicitly states that 
failures in risk assessment and risk management were aggravated by the fact that the checks 
and balances of corporate governance also failed. Many boards and senior managements of 
financial firms neither understood the characteristics of the new, highly complex financial 
products they were dealing with, nor were they aware of the aggregate exposure of their 
companies, thus seriously underestimating the risks they were running. Many board members 
did not provide the necessary oversight or control of management, nor did the owners of these 
companies – the shareholders. Also the OECD report (2009b) points to the lack of sufficient 
expertise on the boards and especially on specialist risk and audit committees of failing 
organisations. The fact that there are recently many changes in board composition is used to 
prove the correctness of this diagnosis.  
Ironically, the large number of non-executives on boards may have made it more 
difficult – not easier – for external directors to influence boardroom decision-making. The 
more numerous external directors become the more unitary boards tend to limit the number of 
executive directors, to the CEO, eventually complemented by the CFO.  
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 In a recent publication (L’Expansion, 2009), Daniel Lebègue, chairman of IFA (the French Institute of 
Directors), stated that directors should consider investing about 2 months per year in a board mandate in a larger 
company. 
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The dominance of the CEO becomes often greater, as there is less scope for external 
directors to develop working relationships with senior members of management. It may also 
be easier for a CEO to manage the information flow to the rest of the board. Non-executive 
directors are at an inherent disadvantage relative to executive management, due to the part-
time nature of the role and their position outside the organisational structure. They invariably 
rely on company insiders for information and expertise. Regardless of their independent 
stature as individuals or their achievements in other sectors or professions, they will face an 
uphill struggle in credibly challenging executive management. It is possibly no coincidence 
that the two areas of the economy which have been subject to volatile cycles of boom and bust 
over the last decade – financial services and technology – are both sectors of activity that are 
potentially highly opaque to non-specialist board members. According to Roger Barker 
(2009), the emphasis that has been placed on independence – as if it was the only thing that 
mattered – in corporate governance codes, European directives, and public discourse has 
created unrealistic expectations of what boards can achieve. Looking forward, the holy grail 
of boardroom design should not be independence, but boardroom competence and 
professionalism. 
Secondly the codes have not paid sufficient attention to the importance of personality 
and attitude issues. When overly stressing independence and the need for critical attitude and 
positions this can lead to board processes that are at odds with a consensus-driven decision-
making in a collegial (one-tier) board. More attention should also be paid to the right tone at 
the top not only for top managers, but for directors as well. All should adhere to and apply the 
principles of integrity and responsible business leadership. For all levels in the organisation 
the choice of people is key. Such choices have to be based on a personality fit with the 
corporate values, the strategic goals and challenges and be translated into all evaluation and 
remuneration systems. Evaluation of board effectiveness as well as the monitoring and 
remuneration of top managers should attach much more importance to these ‘soft’ elements; a 
hard job but all the more rewarding in the long run! 
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Conclusions and recommendations for further reflection 
Although the root causes of the financial crisis seem to lay in macro instabilities -
excessive liquidity and cheap money- and micro regulatory failures, numerous studies also 
point to governance failures, which -at least- aggravated the financial meltdown. This is all 
the more cumbersome since the post-Enron period was characterised by huge attention for 
corporate governance. Were the recommendations insufficient or incorrect, were they not 
sufficiently adopted or was it a combination of the two?  
This reflection note has been trying to look into the governance symptoms behind the 
financial crisis. However we also tempted to go one step further, demanding whether systemic 
governance failures could (partly) explain the financial crisis. In doing so, we came to the 
conclusion that those systemic governance deficiencies were already present at the time of 
Enron and comparable corporate debacles. So the preliminary conclusion may well be that the 
post-Enron governance recommendations have been curing the symptoms but have not 
sufficiently tackled the underlying systemic failures. It is time for a more thorough reflection 
on some of the ‘holy myths’ of the governance religion. 
 
Corporate Governance may not/no longer rely on the assumption that the ‘market will 
take care of it’ 
An essential ingredient of corporate governance best practices is that there should be 
sufficient checks and balances. The governance tripod, composed of top management, board 
of directors and shareholders is exemplary in this respect. Shareholders delegate power down 
to the board, which delegates executive power to top management. The accountability lines go 
all the way up from management to the board and from the board to the shareholders. In such 
a capitalist system the shareholders are the final monitors of the company. Once a company 
goes for listing on the stock exchange, it is assumed that the market becomes the final 
disciplinary mechanism. Since inside shareholders could take advantage of their controlling 
position to detract private benefits, outside shareholders are the final monitors of the listed 
company. In order for outsiders to perform this important monitoring role all shareholders 
should have equal access to information (fair disclosure) and there should rein complete 
transparency about all important business aspects. Since a perfect capital market necessitates 
that market parties can not significantly influence the market price, the capital structure 
should evolve in the direction of widely dispersed shareholdership.  
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The price system will work best when there is a high liquidity built on a high velocity, 
shares being regularly traded and the free float being high. 
Although these governance characteristics are supported by governance literature as 
well as by international governance ratings, it is doubtful that such dispersed, anonymous and 
volatile shareholders can be the final monitors of the listed companies. In a fully dispersed 
shareholder model, management and ‘their’ directors evolve into an autocratic governance 
model with insufficient checks and balances. The debacle of some financial firms, but also the 
Enron and comparable fraud cases -at the beginning of this century- suffered from this ‘strong 
managers – weak owners’ syndrome’. That such models are prone to excessive executive 
remuneration is nearly self-evident. 
However, these observations may not lead us to the conclusion that listing at the stock 
exchange should be abolished. On the contrary, we should look for preserving the benefits of 
listing, without being blind for the numerous potential deficiencies of such governance 
structures. The myth that the market will take care of it has made us blind about the potential 
downsides of such open capital structure. Once we realise that each governance model has its 
potential deficiencies (as well as it positive contributions) we can start developing tailored 
governance recommendations (that should cure these potential downsides). If we compare the 
strengths and weaknesses of insider and outsider models, it is clear that a hybrid combination 
of two needs to be further studied. Shareholder activism is essential to sufficiently monitor a 
firm’s governance and performance. A minimum level of relatively stable shareholders with a 
long-term valuation horizon seems necessary to cure the collective action problems, dispersed 
shareholders are confronted with. Such types of shareholders can be found with family 
shareholders as well as with industrial and institutional shareholders. At the same time, 
sufficient attention should be paid to guarantee that all shareholders are fairly treated and that 
there is fair disclosure and full transparency to outside as well as inside shareholders.   
 
Remuneration systems: from a disciplinary governance remedy to perverse side-effects 
In open listed companies, strong managers need to be disciplined, in order to 
sufficiently take care of the interests of the dispersed shareholders. If managers would be 
generating more income conditional upon an increase in shareholder value, this would align 
their interests with those of the shareholders. So, performance-related incentives became the 
disciplinary mechanism par excellence. 
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However, the remedy turned out to be sometimes worse than the sickness it had to 
cure! In managerial governance models, such variable remuneration systems are open to 
management influence and sometimes to outright manipulation (like in the case of Enron 
e.g.). The financial crisis proved (again) that variable remuneration can lead to short-term 
optimisation and overly risky behaviour. Moreover, such short-term sub-optimisation may 
well have been aggravated by the IFRS-accounting rules. In order to have a level playing field 
for all shareholders, there is need for totally transparent information on the valuation of a 
listed company. So, fair value accounting saw the light. In a boom and bust cycle such 
market-oriented valuations may lead to pro-cyclicality and increased volatility. Potential 
capital gains (market value above original cost or historic value) have to be accounted for, 
leading to an upswing in virtual profitability and reserves. But even worse, such virtual profit 
may easily be distributed through higher variable remuneration, super dividend pay-outs and 
share buy-backs. What a dangerous capital distribution process!!! 
The financial crisis taught us that it is insufficient to focus only on curing the problem 
of executive remuneration. Many organisations, not in the least those in the financial sector, 
have rolled-out the variable remuneration system to many other layers of the organisation. 
After Enron and comparable fraud cases, the governance codes made a plea for a more 
thorough and independent board reflection on remuneration issues. However significant this 
evolution may have been, one can not ignore that the problem has not been sufficiently cured 
yet. Unfortunately there is today more heat than light in the public debate around incentives 
and remuneration structure. In such a climate of societal revenge, there is huge pressure to 
regulate and limit (executive) remuneration (by setting maximum amounts, maximum 
multiples and/or by huge tax rates). We should not have the illusion that regulation alone will 
allow solving such huge problems. Three main lines of corrective actions are open for further 
reflection: What are the components of a remuneration policy and system? How should the 
process to develop and implement such a system look like? What are the necessary 
transparency and accountability rules?  
Developing a remuneration system necessitates a thorough reflection on the definition 
of value creation. Value creation touches upon the ‘raison d’être’ of corporations and will be 
differently answered whether you are a day trader, a hedge fund, a family owner, an employee 
or a customer, to name only a few quite different views. Such definition is extremely 
important for the selection of the correct performance measures or criteria that have to form 
the basis for the variable remuneration. The financial crisis has turned the focus away from 
short-term share value indicators.  
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There seems to grow an overwhelming agreement that whatever criteria used, one 
should make sure that the drivers behind company-wide long-term value creation are 
sufficiently taken into consideration. Interesting best practices point to the use of a balanced 
score card approach to define a variable remuneration system. A second condition is to design 
a variable remuneration policy that supports sound risk management. Variable remuneration 
should not expose to excessive risk-taking at any level. However, integrating risk 
management into the remuneration system will necessitate much harder changes, than merely 
adding a risk management specialist to the remuneration committee. The whole performance 
management approach will have to be expanded in order to integrate the right risk 
dimensions. Even with a balanced score card, the framework will have to be complemented 
with critical risk indicators for each of the critical performance indicators.  
Numerous solutions and possible remedies have already been suggested to cure the 
perverse side-effects of variable remuneration. Some make a plea for limiting the relative 
weight of variable remuneration or for setting a maximum cap on (total) variable 
remuneration. In order to integrate the possible downside into variable remuneration, 
suggestions are made to introduce a bonus-malus provision that will smooth positive and 
negative variable remuneration. A longer term horizon would be introduced with the 
obligation to develop a multi-year framework for the assessment of bonuses as well as to 
extend the period for the vesting of stock options. Claw-back clauses could give the company 
the right to oblige managers to pay back variable remuneration that has been incorrectly paid 
out (e.g. due to misrepresentation of performance). If it is true that much of the remuneration 
problems go back to corporate behaviour, the challenge is even more huge, i.e. to change 
corporate attitude and behaviour  Or should we look for more drastic solutions, like abolishing 
all complex formula of variable remuneration? 
In designing the process to be followed, an important question is ‘who is responsible 
for what part of the remuneration puzzle?’ What is the role of the board of directors and of the 
remuneration committee, do shareholders have a ‘say on pay’ and what input should be 
expected from executive management and from external remuneration consultants? The 
responsibilities of both external monitors and internal monitors are at stake and should be 
carefully revisited in order to find solutions to cure the remuneration problems. For what 
concerns the internal monitors, the first duty rests with the board of directors and its 
remuneration committee. New recommendations include an interactive collaboration of the 
remuneration committee with the chief risk officer in order to analyse the risk profile 
associated with the performance criteria set forward.  
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To this end, the remuneration committee should have a risk expert in its midst. 
Remuneration consultants should be subjected to tougher criteria of independence (towards 
management) and their remuneration comparisons need to be judged more critically (a 
secondary rather than a primary source of comparison). But also shareholders do have an 
important role to play in curing the problem of myopic short-termism and overly risky 
ventures. Re-alignment will be harder with short-term oriented shareowners/traders than with 
long term shareholders.  
Increased shareholder as well as societal pressure for corporate accountability and 
transparency on (executive) remuneration will probably induce tougher rules than ever before. 
The ghost is out of the bottle and it will be hard, if possible at all, to get him back in the 
bottle. Boards will have to evolve from a disclosure -style ‘show me’- to a ‘prove me’ style of 
accountability. The remuneration committee will be asked to provide evidence of how well its 
remuneration policies measure against the new governance principles. Where there is a 
significant shortfall, they will have to come up with plans for improvement. Coupled with the 
increased call for external credibility, there will also be an increasing demand for internal 
transparency. The traditional external market fairness examinations will have to be 
complemented with a thorough analysis of the internal fairness in executive remuneration! 
 
In search for mechanisms to focus more on long term value creation and corporate 
responsibility  
The combination of short-term volatile shareowners and performance-related 
incentives has been a dangerous cocktail behind the financial crisis. One of the main critiques 
on the financial market parties is that they -by far- focused too much on short-term value 
creation, at the detriment of huge risk exposures, while also ignoring the long-term and 
societal effect. In the absence of long-term shareholders, most listed companies are driven, if 
not biased by the share price and sometimes worse, making important choices and decisions 
on the base of the potential effect on the next quarter results. 
Contrary to the growing attention for corporate social responsibility, most of the 
world-wide discussions on corporate governance ignore the ethical and stakeholder 
perspective. There have rarely been bridges between the traditional financial and governance 
frameworks at the one hand and the socially responsible reporting frameworks at the other 
hand.  
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The corporate governance debate remains constrained to the private interests of the 
parties involved and does not include the public good that may be affected by company 
decisions. There seems to grow a general consensus that shareholders should become more 
supportive of the long-term effects of business decisions and choices. The pressure is on 
companies to educate their shareholders so that they become more receptive, if not supportive 
of long-term value creation and sustainability. Paying attention for devastating externalities is 
certainly necessary in sectors like the financial sector, where financial stability can be seen as 
a public good. In such cases directors should (be obliged to) take the general interest into 
consideration, when making important business decisions. But more generally, all boards of 
directors should attach sufficient attention to the respect of the interests of the relevant 
stakeholders hereby stimulating the creation of ‘enlightened’ shareholder value. 
 
Large failures in risk modelling and risk management, aggravated by governance 
failures  
In a financial market with plenty liquidity and low interest rates, investors as well as 
financial players were actively searching for higher yields, accepting more risk. Moreover, 
risk became mis-priced from several perspectives. Assets were granted a good rating without 
tough scrutiny of the quality of the counter parties involved. In the ‘originate-to-distribute 
model’ there was no incentive to ensure high lending standards. Moreover it was assumed that 
global risk spreading over numerous layers and parties was supposed to almost, if not fully, 
eliminate the risks involved. Financial institutions and credit rating agencies assumed stable 
markets, hereby completely ignoring systemic risk.  
Proper risk assessment was very difficult and opaque for external and internal 
supervisors. This is very disturbing since the post Sarbanes-Oxley time frame was 
characterised by huge investments in risk management and internal control. And these proved 
to be ineffective! Analyses of failing financial institutions showed numerous governance 
deficiencies. Information about risk exposures did not reach the board and even senior levels 
of management. Risk management was often activity or product rather than enterprise-based. 
Such silo approach of risk assessment induced an insufficient awareness of the firm-wide 
exposure and of the correlations between different risk factors. In other cases, boards had 
approved strategy but did not establish suitable metrics to monitor its implementation. 
Company disclosures about foreseeable risk factors and about the systems in place for 
monitoring and managing risk have also left a lot to be desired. 
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It is of utmost importance that several routes for improvement are further investigated. 
A first observation is that business practice presumably has not sufficiently tackled all 
relevant and important risk exposures. Internal control and risk management systems mainly 
devote attention to managing financial and operational risk, but do ignore most of the 
‘strategic’ risks. From a theoretical perspective, the Enterprise Risk Model encompasses all 
types of risks. However, reality is far from this theoretical model. Did the risk managers have 
the right expertise to tackle the strategic risks or were they not involved, nor consulted to 
advise on strategic risks? But also boards need to understand the firm’s business strategy from 
a forward looking perspective, not just reviewing current risk issues and audit reports. 
Management should facilitate that the board can exercise its responsibility to oversee the 
complete risk exposure and to decide on the risk appetite of the corporation. They should 
make sure there is a true audit of the strategic risks, analysing different possible scenarios, 
each with its underlying risks and assumptions as well as with the overall effect on the firm-
wide risk exposure.  
Another route for further improvement relates to internal governance. Although the 
famous Sarbanes-Oxley act as well as the OECD governance principles attached special 
attention to developing governance beyond the board level this internal governance aspect has 
presumably not received the business attention it deserves. Complex webs of companies, joint 
ventures and the like have been built around the world. With the interrelationship between 
players and products came also an important increase of vulnerability and systemic risk. The 
more complex and global corporations become and the more sophisticated product 
innovations are, the more unrealistic it is to assume that a limited number of top people and 
directors at corporate level can follow-up and completely oversee such global web of 
organisations and complex products. If accountability and governance rules are not deployed 
to all relevant levels of a complex organisation, no top management, directors, nor 
shareholders can have a quiet night sleep.  
But whatever investments we should make in developing further the internal 
governance system, we may not ignore to raise even more fundamental questions: Have we 
not reached a level where diseconomies of scale and scope become devastating? Have we not 
underestimated the cost of complexity? Should we also not review the loss of control and 
knowledge caused by outsourcing, reduction of headquarters, etc? Charting such complexity 
costs should become intrinsically part of good governance practice. 
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The analysis of the failures in corporate risk management is incomplete if one should 
not also point to the behavioural dimensions. The top or senior risk manager should have a 
high-ranking status and be allowed to have a direct line with the board of directors 
(comparable to the internal auditor). Another remedy being that companies should move 
towards a culture of shared responsibility and mutual respect. 
 
Governance mechanisms: insufficient focus on substance and too much attention for 
formalities  
The reports on the financial crisis pose the question whether boards are up to their 
huge tasks. Events have raised questions about the ability of certain boards to properly 
oversee senior management and to understand and monitor the business. This is all the more 
problematic since the post-Enron era was characterised by an increased empowerment of the 
board of directors. The critique on directors and managers mirrors the disappointment of 
society at large with the ineffectiveness of the investments in governance structures and 
procedures.  
Overlooking such analyses, we have to conclude that most of the deficiencies finally 
boil down to fallacies in corporate behaviour and governance attitude. Curing such 
deficiencies can hardly be reached by regulation or legislation. We will -whether we like it or 
not- have to rely on improving the focus of the governance codes and on redefining ‘Best 
Practices’. Up till now most best practices were defined with reference to ‘easy to check’ 
input characteristics, like the percentage of independent directors, the split of the function of 
CEO and board chair, the instalment of board committees and the like.  
Board effectiveness and the quality of governance are also, if not more, driven by the 
right governance processes and the right attitude. Moreover, this attention for corporate 
attitude and behaviour does not stop at the board of directors or at the level of top 
management. On the contrary, everybody should be involved in this attitude focus.  
There is a need to reconsider the primordial role of board when it comes to having the 
right leadership. Much more attention should be paid to the personality of the top people. The 
mindset, the ethical attitude, the integrity of people do necessitate much more attention At the 
same time managers will have to educate their shareholders and try to withstand short-term 
market pressures. Strong managers have a straight back in defending long-term strategies and 
investments, even if short-term oriented shareholders/sharetraders would pressure them to act 
otherwise.  
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When it comes to the board’s strategic role, directors should clearly define the specific 
risk appetite of the firm, making a thorough discussion of possible strategic scenario’s, with 
sufficient attention for the specific risk/performance profile of each possible route ahead. In 
monitoring corporate performance, boards should pay attention to financial as well as to non-
financial elements. One of the duties of the board is to have a very clear understanding of the 
final goals of the firm, considering criteria to evaluate the long-term shareholder value as well 
as the impact on the relevant stakeholders. Such (balanced score card) framework should be 
applied whenever important decisions and choices have to be made. 
Finally, the board composition also deserves further reflection. Independence has been 
the most important characteristic the codes have relied upon. This is incomplete from two 
respects. First of all, independence may not come at the detriment of sufficient business 
insight, expertise and insight into the strategic challenges and risks of the business portfolio.  
Analyses of the financial crisis point to the lack of sufficient expertise on the boards 
and especially on specialist risk and audit committees of failing organisations. Looking 
forward, the holy grail of boardroom design should not only focus on independence, but on 
boardroom competence and professionalism as well. Secondly the codes have not paid 
sufficient attention to the importance of personality and attitude issues and the need for a clear 
fit between board personalities, corporate values, strategic goals and challenges. Evaluation of 
board effectiveness as well as the monitoring and remuneration of top managers should attach 
much more importance to such ‘soft’ personality characteristics; a hard job, but all the more 
rewarding in the long run! 
 
In search for a right balance between regulation and self-regulation 
Due to the loopholes in the regulation of financial market players and the serious 
monitoring mismatch, the cry for more and tougher regulation is loud and clear. Although 
there are many arguments in favour of such extra regulation, the danger is that this will not be 
limited to the financial sector. To the extent that the origin of the crisis is more systemic to the 
financial sector, it should be questioned whether enlargement of the regulatory impact outside 
the financial institutions is justified.  
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On the other hand, we have demonstrated that numerous deficiencies finally boil down 
to corporate behaviour and attitude. Such deficiencies can not be cured by regulation. As 
stated by a member of the European Corporate Governance Forum (2009a;5) instead of trying 
to master things through regulation an attempt should be made to look into the behavioural 
patterns to understand what factors are driving the behaviour of market actors20. In this 
respect it is worthwhile to mention that the European Corporate Governance Forum as well as 
the OECD, the ICGN and the FSA (in the UK) all plead for tougher board evaluations that 
ensure that governance policies are functioning appropriately. Such evaluation needs to use 
external input in order to reach the objective to reveal whether the board functions as a group 
or whether it is dominated by individuals and to what extent the board is up to its huge tasks.  
Self-regulation has the great advantage of flexibility, offering the possibility to tailor 
to the diverging and changing needs of the business world. Those that criticise self regulation, 
should be reassured because soft law may finally have more teeth than originally assumed. 
This is certainly the case when jurisprudence is developed with reference to these self-
regulatory principles. On top of that, boards of directors and shareholders that formally adhere 
to the governance principles will considerably increase the strength of self-regulation. 
However, we may not be blind that self-regulation will need to be complemented with 
additional regulation. There seems to be a consensus that this will certainly be the case when 
it comes to transparency and accountability on (executive) remuneration. 
                                               
 
20
 The Commission is even asked to put some money in research on this issue. 
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